Imagining sustainability: The added value of transition scenarios in transition management by Sondeijker, S.A.G.C. (Saartje) et al.
Imagining sustainability: the added value of
transition scenarios in transition
management
Saartje Sondeijker, Jac Geurts, Jan Rotmans and Arnold Tukker
Abstract
Purpose – To address lessons that specify the impact and contribution of current scenario methods
when focused on facilitating transition management processes.
Design/methodology/approach – Comparative literature review based on transition management and
scenario development.
Research limitations/implications – Need of further systemic thought about the required criteria of
transition scenarios and the embedding of scenario use in transition management processes.
Practical implications – Processes of transition management are in need of transition specific
scenarios.
Originality/value – Because transition management implies a complex and long-term steering
paradigm with which current scenario applications are not familiar, conclusions are drawn on the
(changing) requirements of scenario development processes in transition management and on the need
to innovate current scenario methods in the context of transition management.
Keywords Transition management, Sustainable development
Paper type Literature review
Introduction
While the concept of sustainable development has stimulated considerable debate on
specific interpretations, it is clear that inherent in the notion is a concern for the long-range
future over at least several generations (Gallopin et al., 1997). This is because our complex
society deals with long-term persistent problems that are deeply rooted in our structures and
institutions and for which no tailor-made solutions are available (Dirven et al., 2002). These
problems of sustainability in relation to the rapidly changing societal environment and the
existing lack of possibilities for steering, force us to structurally reorientate our thoughts and
actions (Rotmans et al., 2005). Projections of trends may be legitimate over the short-term,
but not as time horizons expand from months and years to decades and generations
(Gallopin et al., 1997). What seem to be promising or optimal choices in the short term might
turn out to be sub optimal or even destructive in the long term (van Asselt et al., 2005).
Transition management (TM) is a systemic approach, postulated as a new governance
model which is concerned with steering and coordinating large-scale system innovations
towards greater sustainability. An important part consists of envisioning sustainable future
trajectories. On a strategic level, we use creative processes of scenario building for this. The
most prominent function of the so-called transition scenarios (to be further defined later) is to
strive for a fundamental, irreversible reframing of our current paradigms (Rotmans et al.,
2005). While the transition scenarios will be renegotiated and reshaped as the process
unfolds, they provide a long-term perspective as an orientation for short-term action. The
participative engagement of actors with diverse backgrounds will lead to new insights into
the nature of the problems and the underlying causal mechanisms. This will offer actors
freedom and breathing space to come up with new directions for solutions to persistent
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problems. These insights form the prelude to a new way of thinking which serves the basis
for alignment, enrolment and mobilization of collective action necessary to initiate and
maintain sustainable system innovations (Kemp and Rotmans, 2001, cited in Berkhout,
2005; Rotmans, 2005).
Although the TM model has only recently been introduced, it has already been adopted in
several projects. Two examples are:
1. the Energy Transition, which is initiated by VROM (Ministry of housing, land use, planning
and environmental management) and Senternovem (Agency for sustainability and
innovation); and
2. Parkstad Limburg.
Purpose of the former is to generate a sustainable energy system in The Netherlands by
giving high priority to tackling persistent problems like climate change and the growing
dependence of oil and gas from politically instable regions.
Government has a leading role in this process of renewal by facilitating necessary
interactions between business, societal organizations, consumers, knowledge institutions
and herself. Actions are directed at focused and ventured innovations in the energy system
within the orientation of a long-term vision (Advies VROM-raad and algemene energieraad,
2004). The latter, region Parkstad Limburg paid too little attention to the suppression of inter
municipal competition and to the positioning of Parkstad Limburg in Europe. Therefore,
visions were developed that stimulated focus and direction for future development
trajectories towards a more embedded region (Report of the core group Parkstad Limburg
(Advies kerngroep Structuurvisie Parkstad Limburg 2030, 2003).
Besides this optimism, there are also several drawbacks. Although it is recognized that
scenario development processes can provide direction and focus in TM processes by
reflecting upon structural changes in society and developing long-term images of
sustainable worlds, the use of these methods within TM is still rather limited. Reason lies in
the fact that transition experts assume that current scenario methods cannot handle the
complexity and dynamics of a transition, and that adjustments in the prevailing scenario
methods are necessary (Rotmans, 2005; Elzen et al., 2004; Berkhout, 2005). This
assumption builds on the notion of Wiek et al. (2006) who address the relevance of scenario
use within processes of TM. We take this notion a step further by not only addressing their
relevance but also questioning their quality when instrumental for TM. Given this assumption,
a first task is to give systemic thought to required criteria of scenario development processes
when assisting TM. In a later stage these criteria can be further developed into scenario
methodologies. The latter is not within the scope of this article but the relevance needs to be
addressed. Until now, most scenario applications have been carried out in isolation, serving
the goal of policy making. Therefore, they have a strong orientation towards content aspects
(Berkhout and Hertin, 2002; van der Heijden, 2005; Schwartz, 2005; Ringland, 2002).
Transition scenarios on the other hand are embedded in a TM trajectory, i.e. they build on
and refine the conditions of sustainable visions by developing these further into concrete
storylines. The resulting transition scenarios then provide direction and focus for the
identification of sub themes that can be developed into transition pathways, eventually
leading to experiments. For these reasons, more attention has to be paid to process related
aspects of scenario development.
Also on a more global scale, in Agenda 21[1], the need for a systemic approach like TM in
relation to future thinking was explicitly recognized. However, they also mark that there has
not been remarkable progress since. It is recognized that scenarios pursued in sustainability
science should be conducted at all scale levels using a systemic approach. They should be
comprehensive, participatory and anticipative as well as adaptive. Useful scenarios for TM
must stress integration, recognize uncertainty, appreciate irreducible normative aspects,
and engage the public in discourse on sustainable development (Raskin et al., 2002). The
Earth Summit in 1992[2] also marked the recognition that environmental, social, and
economic concerns are closely connected and must be pursued jointly. Yet structures of
power and habits of mind change slowly. Many scenario development efforts are still
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narrowly focused, and effective scenario methods for more integrated approaches to
sustainable development are still lacking (Gallopin et al., 1997). Action is needed to develop
appropriate methodologies (Raskin et al., 2002).
Summarized, TM is a promising governance model with regard to the drive towards a more
sustainable world. Promising projects have been initiated, but theory and practice about
how scenario development processes can be embedded in TM can and must be brought a
step further.
Outline
Main purpose of this article is to address the question whether current scenario methods
need adjustments in order to be useful in facilitating transition management processes.
However, before we can give an in-depth insight in potential innovations for scenario
methods it is useful to first explain the origin and the concept of TM and the added value that
scenarios can have within TM. Based on these insights, process and content criteria for
transition scenarios can be derived. In order to address the required innovations in current
scenario methods, it is useful to give a state-of-the-art of past and current scenario methods.
As will be seen, changing requirements of scenario methods over time follow an
ever-growing perceptional increase in the complexity of the environment over time. Based
on these insights, a comparative literature review will be made between the prevailing
scenario methods and the required criteria of scenario methods when instrumental for
transition management. This in order to address lessons that specify the impact and
contribution of current scenario methods when focused on facilitating transition
management processes.
Transition management
Origin and concept of TM
Over the past decade environmental concerns have increasingly been integrated into the
management routines of both states and corporations. Since the mid 1990s there has been
an impressive growth in the literature of sustainability challenges (WCED, 1987; Gallopin
et al., 1997; Raskin et al., 2002, Meadowcroft, 2005). Sustainability research defines a
fascinating new program of scientific research. It is the basis for an early warning system that
can alert decision-makers and the public on future perils and provide guidance on ways to
respond. This paragraph will reflect on a recent development in this field.
Origin of TM
In addition to what has been said earlier about the concept of TM, it is a governance model
aimed at the creation of micro-level initiatives that will structurally transform a regime through
a process of scaling up (Rotmans, 2003). The long-term transition scenarios foster direction
and focus for initiating and realizing this societal transformation towards sustainability. The
ideal outcome is a transition, a non-linear process of societal change in which the structure of
a societal system transforms (Rotmans, 2003). Transition management has its roots in
complexity theory, governance theory and social theory. As it is not the purpose of this article
to describe into depth the underlying theories of TM and its associated assumptions, the
basic notions will be briefly highlighted in order to better understand the origin of TM.
Complexity theory has its primary focus on the dynamics of complex, adaptive systems
(Krohn et al., 1990) with which the dynamics of a transition are comparable. Complexity
theory lends us the insight that complexity must be viewed as a means of leverage for
steering. Anticipative – as well as adaptive steering mechanismsmust be combined in order
to transform a complex, adaptive system from one state to another. Governance theory is
relevant for TM in that it addresses the need to direct complex societal dynamics. Although
traditional forms of governance have proven to be inadequate for steering societal
challenges with a high degree of complexity ((Mayntz, 1993), (March and Olson, 1995), (Fox
and Miller, 1996), (Scharpf, 1999), (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), (Teisman, 2005) cited in
Rotmans, 2005), new forms of governance are more in line with the notion of societal
complexity and – dynamics. TM contains the main characteristics of these new forms of
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governance i.e. network management (Dirven et al., 2002; Kickert et al., 1997), interactivity
(de Bruin et al., 1998; Dirven et al., 2002), pluralism (Grin, 2004; Rotmans, 2003), multi-level
focus (Rotmans and Rothman, 2003) and social learning (Leeuwis, 2003; Loeber, 2004).
Social theory offers a useful starting point for analyzing societal dynamics. In that sense,
social theory forms a bridge between complexity and governance in that it describes and
explains the co-evolution between actors, structures and practices. Social theory starts from
the notion that interactions exist between structures, actors and practices. The assumption
is that societal structure is both the result and means of acting: Intended and unintended
effects of acting lead to a social structure. Once it exists, it contributes to the determination of
rules and means for the actions of societal actors (Giddens, 1984, cited in Rotmans, 2005),
(Grin et al., 2003).
A closer comparative analysis between the concepts of TM and these theories reveals also
many differences, suggesting that TM shares features to each of these approaches but is
reducible to none of them. However, an in depth description of differences and similarities
does not serve the purpose of this article. Therefore, we suffice with only mentioning the
background against which TM has developed and continue the next paragraph with
explaining the main concepts of TM that are relevant in light of scenario development
processes.
Concept of TM
Transitions are important in relation to sustainable development as they can open the door to
radical improvements in societal performance (Meadowcroft, 2005). Although transitions
cannot be controlled in any absolute sense, they can be influenced through intentional
intervention. Transition management is a deliberate attempt to bring about long-term change
on a system level (Rotmans, 2005). This requires the encouragement of a coalescence of
seemingly unrelated bottom-up initiatives that follow on diverse global trends (Raskin et al.,
2002). ‘‘Seemingly unrelated’’ because these diverse niche-based innovations take place on
different societal domains, each domain having its own pace of change. Rapid movements
characterize i.e. economic developments while cultural developments can be recognized
by relatively slow movements. Therefore, the initiated innovations seem to exist in isolation.
However, the reinforcement of the different innovations into a joint project for structural
change is a prerequisite for a transition to happen (Rotmans, 2005). This mechanism is time
dependent and only occurs when developments in different domains synchronize in one and
the same direction. A purpose of TM is to cultivate the right incentives for synchronization to
happen. This is also called goal-oriented modulation (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003;
Meadowcroft, 2005). The stimulation of different niche-based innovations is intended to
nurture sustainable alternatives to existing practices. This may prelude the long-term path
towards a regime transformation or a regime shift.
This long-term perspective is embodied in transition scenarios, which are defined as
participatory explorations of possible development trajectories that incorporate a structural
systems change towards a desired, sustainable future state of the system. The term
‘‘explorations’’ in the foregoing definition indicates that the pathway towards a sustainable
future can be characterized as an uncertain one, in need of a reflexive process of searching,
learning and experimenting. As transition patterns have multiple (often conflicting)
determinants such as behavior, culture, technology, economy, institutions, environment
and policy, the pathways towards a sustainable system state cannot be outlined and
predicted in advance. Also, although people today are working in similar conditions of
uncertainty as in former times, the higher risks and uncertainties of larger scale activities
(Beck, 1992, cited in Harremoe¨s et al., 2001) and the greater pressure from the mass media
(Smith, 2000, cited in Harremoe¨s et al., 2001) make it more difficult to survive and grow in this
era of uncertainty. All this means that ‘‘the future’’ cannot be treated as an objective fact but
needs to be thought of as being emergent and only partially knowable. The focus is on
learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning while exploring interrelationships among trends
and key uncertainties. In this sense, the future should not be treated as an ‘‘empirical’’ reality
but rather as a set of only partially viewable alternatives that describe a ‘‘possibility space’’
(Gallopin et al., 1997). Focused on transition scenarios, people should strive not only for a
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single scenario, which most likely corresponds with their expectations, but instead they
should try to acquire multiple scenarios that describe the whole ‘‘window of opportunities’’
(Fink et al., 2004). The acknowledgement of a multiplicity of transition scenarios is presented
as a strategy to:
B map out the nature and types of uncertainty in order to anticipate on it,
B to avoid a premature lock-in by keeping options open, and to
B create space and ambition for new directions in solutions.
This in contrast to traditional approaches of futuring that tend to seek for a single truth and
representation of reality, thereby ignoring uncertainty (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1987). In
conclusion, as traditional approaches still seek to develop plausible assumptions about the
future, the accuracy of projections within TS has no longer priority. Rather, they aim to
provide a imaginative systematic framework to draw out, challenge and refine knowledge
about the future (Raskin et al., 2002).
When operationalizing TM, the main instrument is the establishment of transition arenas. The
actors within a transition arena take part in a cyclical process, also called TM-cycle, within
which problems are structured, visions, transition scenarios and transition pathways are
developed, networks are mobilized, experiments are carried out, results are monitored and
learning points are reflected on. Within this article, attention will only be paid to the
development of transition scenarios. Recent literature on other parts of the TM cycle can be
found in Loorbach and Rotmans (2006).
The transition arena should be seen as an innovation network on a strategical level,
consisting of forerunners from various backgrounds, confronting and integrating each
other’s perceptions over persistent problems. These deliberations lead to a new way of
looking at reality that manifests itself in the form of a shared problem perception (Loorbach,
2004). Based on these insights actors should come to realize that sustainability cannot be
realized by continuing current practices. Habits of mind have to change and developing
transition scenarios of long-term sustainable futures onsets this process. By deliberating
over desirable pathways towards sustainability, the bridge to be breached from now towards
the future comes into focus and creates a sense of urgency. Construction of transition
scenarios goes beyond reason generation in that it examines combinations of events that
may seem idealistic and improbable from today’s perspective – but are possible, and
maybe even necessary to achieve goals of sustainability (Raskin et al., 2002). As the
development of transition scenarios is integrated in the TM-cycle just mentioned, the
condition arises to further concretize and downscale the scenarios in a stepwise manner.
This way, transition scenarios can provide support for bringing long-term desirable futures
into contact with short-term practices that are of value for today. The long-term images on a
system level provide insight in the problems that need to be tackled and the neglected areas
that need more attention in the future. Based on this, different themes can de identified and
subsequent pathways can be developed on a tactical level. On an operational level, end
goals and sub goals can be defined, coalitions can be formed and concrete experiments
can be thought of.
Added value of scenarios within processes of TM
Now that the background and the concept of TM are explained and the use of scenario
methods within TM is clarified, one could wonder why scenario methods in itself are useful
within processes of TM and more specifically why they are more useful than other methods
related to future thinking, i.e. forecasts, trend extrapolation etc. This paragraph will deal with
these questions.
First of all, recent literature on transition management has placed a great deal of importance
on the role of the creation of scenarios for a sustainable future (Kemp and Rotmans, 2001,
cited in Berkhout, 2005). Reason lies in the fact that transition management only recently is
more and more seen as the pretension that long-term, co-evolutionary processes in society
are not an inescapable fact-of-life, to be understood in retrospect rather that be controlled
pro-actively. Policy makers are not detached and clinical observers of change, they are
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active participants able to onset innovations in the right direction (Bruggink, 2005).
Scenarios provide long-term images of sustainable futures on a strategical level. In this
sense, they serve as a framework for short-term actions at an operational level. They ensure
the enrolment of actors into coalitions for change and strategic conversation within and
between these coalitions. This is supposed to result in alignment and mobilization of
collective action necessary to initiate and maintain sustainable system innovations.
Second, Kasemir et al. (2003) argue that scenario development is an approach that is well
suited to explore a transition towards sustainability. The basis of scenario development lies in
surfacing weak signals that herald changes in society, sometimes fundamental in nature, be
they political, economic or social. Often it requires a unique combination of elements to
initiate the onset of transitions, i.e. subsidies, network support, technology innovation,
experiments and paradigm shift. Scenario development, by addressing such combinations,
is one of the few methodologies that offer the opportunity to prepare us for transitions.
Third, as already said before, the discussion within the first phase of a transition arena is
assumed to facilitate the convergence of different problem perceptions based on the
articulation of diverse perspectives of forerunners. This leads to new visions on the nature of
problems and the underlying causal mechanisms. The resulting scenarios can prelude the
paradigm shift that is necessary for the realization of the transition that is strived for.
Processes of scenario development are not only crucial for indicating the gap between now
and the future but also for sharply indicating the desired direction of development. This
direction creates the space in which future transition activities can be exploited and is
therefore an absolute necessary condition for a successful continuation of the trajectory.
The fourth value of scenarios within TM builds on the paradigm shift mentioned in the
preceding one. The intended benefit of scenarios is that they stretch as well as focus
people’s thinking. The presumption is that scenarios on the one hand reduce overconfidence
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982) by making available to the mind futures not yet considered (Koriat
et al., 1980) as well as challenge those presumed likely (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). In this
light, Ringland (2002) argues that the challenge for sustainable development is to
understand and imagine the complexity of the future so that we are prepared for the
unthinkable. Anchoring is an important psychological factor contributing to the above
presumption. Scenarios can shift the anchor or basis from which people view the future, also
called ‘‘reframing’’ (Berkhout et al., 2002). For most people, the most typical mental anchor is
the past and usually they do not adjust their thinking very far from this starting point.
However, social learning processes and reflexivity can teach us that the past may be a highly
misleading guide to the future (Gilovich, 1981), especially after major discontinuities have
occurred such as tax changes, deregulation etc. On the other hand, the value of scenarios
lies in the capacity to focus many individually held images. Without this clarity, scenarios
cease to have a practical value for society, in the sense of providing a basis for the
mobilization of collective action towards sustainable system innovations on the short term
(Berkhout et al., 2002). These two characteristics of scenarios – stretching and focusing –
are more or less contradictory. Therefore, scenarios need to strike a balance between on the
one hand representing a window of opportunities and on the other hand functional clarity
and simplicity (Berkhout et al., 2002).
Transition scenarios
Foregoing paragraphs explained the concept of TM and clarified the use and function of
scenario development within TM processes. Based on these insights, it is possible to
condense process and content criteria of scenario methods that are required when assisting
TM processes. This does not mean that we provide a completely developedmethodology for
transition scenarios – as this is still work in progress and something that needs further
research – we simply point out the process and content criteria that characterize a scenario
method instrumental for TM. Based on our literature review, we presuppose that these
criteria are useful and necessary when developing transition scenarios. As will be seen later
on, some of these requirements are new and distinctive for transition scenarios, some build
on existing insights of scenario development in the (recent) past.
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Process – and content criteria of transition scenarios
The process criteria of transition scenarios refer to cognitive and/or behavioral processes
that need be encouraged during the participative engagement of scenario development.
The content criteria refer to the characteristics of the contents of the actual transition
scenarios.
Process criteria of transition scenarios
B It is an explicit purpose to onset a seek- and social learning process for exploring
desirable future pathways towards sustainability and translating these into concrete
experiments on an operational level. As a transition is surrounded by complexity and
uncertainty, we need to stimulate an anticipative and adaptive attitude towards future
complexity and changing circumstances in society.
B Generate a sense of urgency that convinces actors of the necessity of a structural change
in the societal system. This should also encourage actors to feel free in generating
innovative ideas for directions to sustainable solutions.
B Internalize a change in the mindset on a system level, meaning that actors need to start
thinking in terms of the complexity of a transition and the associated consequences in
time. Therefore, a long-term orientation is needed while being sensible for weak signals.
B Stretching while focusing, as already thoroughly explained in the foregoing paragraph.
Content criteria of transition scenarios
B The transition scenarios need to be as open as possible in exploring desirable pathways
towards the future because we need to build in a reflexive attitude towards future
complexity and uncertainties. Due to the fact that TM strives for sustainability, the
explorative notion is guided by a normative framework of sustainability.
B In order to create a feeling among actors (in an arena) that they are working in concert
towards future ambitions of sustainability, a transition scenario needs to be focused on a
societal transition challenge. Therefore, persistent problems on the short-term need to be
translated into sustainable ambitions on the long term.
B As transition scenarios are developed at a strategic level, they need to deal with the
complexity and the dynamics of the whole system and not only a subsystem. Also,
overarching transition concepts like i.e. multi-scale, co-evolution, modulation and scaling
up need to be captured.
B Transition scenarios are instrumental in the TM-cycle. Therefore, besides being of value
for the strategic level at which they are developed, they also need to be of value for the
tactical and the operational level. This implies that the storylines, giving insight in the
unfolding societal developments over a period of one or two generations, need to be the
framework and orientation for short-term actions.
B The transition scenarios need to have a utopian character because when striving for a
societal transition, we inherently strive for a structural change in a systems’ structure, its
processes and its culture. Therefore, when transition scenarios would result in
optimization strategies we would have failed in realizing this structural change that we
believe is necessary for reaching future sustainability. This implies that the future images
in transition scenarios need to be derogative from our prevailing perception of reality,
impossible to reach by sufficing with optimization strategies. However, in order to bring
about long-term commitment, the current perceived reality of actors needs to be
captured. Therefore, the transition trajectories which lead to the images need to be based
on informed imagination.
B Finally the storylines need to be integral, consistent and coherent. Integral, meaning that
the storylines describe complex patterns that emerge from the dynamics yielded by
mutual action-reaction patterns. Consistent, meaning that the elements of the storyline
build progressively on one another and are not contradictory. Coherent, meaning that all
the parts of the transition scenario fit well together and form a united whole.
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In order to retrieve the distinctiveness of these criteria, and thus the need for
innovations/specifications in existing scenario practices when used for facilitating TM, it is
useful to first give a state-of-the-art of scenarios.
Scenarios
State-of-the-art
Research on the future has heterogeneous traditions and strands, including scenario
planning, ‘‘La prospective’’ and strategic management. It did not develop in a linear way but
has been influenced by a number of schools – the RAND Corporation, Stanford Research
Institute (now called SRI International), Shell, SEMA Metra Consulting Group, and many
others (van der Heijden, 2005). This intellectual history of futures research is complex but
basic stages can be recapitulated based on societal developments in the world
(Schoemaker, 1993).
In its broadest sense, scenario thinking is as old as prospective story telling. However, as a
tool for future thinking, its formal roots trace back half a century, to early systems thinking in
the 1940s and the use of computer simulation in the Manhattan project. In 1942, atomic
physicists such as Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Teller and Compton were unsure whether a
full-scale explosion of the atom bomb might literally ignite the skies (Davis, 1968, cited in
Schoemaker, 1993). Computer simulations were used to estimate probabilities of the
atmosphere and the planet catching fire. The subsequent flourishing of scenarios seems to
reflect three relatively independent research strands. First, the development of computers
enabled simulated solutions for otherwise intractable problems. Second, game theory (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947, cited in Schoemaker, 1993) provided a rich theoretical
structure for the study of social interaction and conflict (Dresher, 1961; Shubik, 1964, cited in
Schoemaker, 1993). Third, the post-war defense needs of the USA required war games in
which humans and machines interacted. The RAND Corporation played a central role in
bringing these strands together for military purposes (Kahn and Mann, 1957, cited in
Schoemaker, 1993). Kahn and Wiener (1967), who were part of the RAND Corporation,
explored possible consequences of nuclear proliferation, defining scenarios as
‘‘hypothetical sequences of events constructed with the purpose of focusing attention on
causal processes and decision points’’. More specifically, Herman Kahn coined the term
‘‘scenario’’ when he introduced his technique of ‘‘future-now thinking’’. This resulted in his
famous book The Year 2000 which combined detailed analysis with the use of the
imagination to produce a report that people living in the future might have written (Berkhout
et al., 2002; van Notten, 2005). Kahn reasoned that imagination had always been integral to
the contemplation of the future, and that scenarios were a way of stimulating and disciplining
imaginative thinking (van Notten, 2005).
First generation of scenarios
Influenced by Kahn and Wiener, the first generation of scenarios can be traced back to the
1950s and 1960s when Western countries faced the prospect of uninterrupted economic
growth, structural transformation of the economy accompanied by rapid urbanization and a
strong consensus to develop the welfare state. A major focus in these scenarios was
technological and economic forecasting using hard methods, i.e. trend extrapolation,
cross-impact analysis, simulation and technological forecasting models (Khakee, 1999),
leading to feasible and relatively surprise-free futures. Scenarios were not more than
statistical predictions of end state descriptions (Schoemaker, 1993) whereby probability
distributions of possible future outcomes were estimated to improve the quality of
decision-making (Ringland, 2002). The break in the economic growth trend, following the oil
crisis in 1973, came as a shock and resulted in a loss of faith in trend extrapolations and
other economic and technological forecasting approaches which dominated the planning
practice at that time (Khakee, 1999). Also, due to the lack of integration between scientific
knowledge and intuitive knowledge (Khakee, 1999), long-term forecasting has increasingly
become discredited because more often than not predictions have proven to be incorrect
(Berkhout et al., 2002). Scenarios tended either to overestimate the potential of modern
technology and the pace of change (Kahn and Wiener, 1967) or to underestimate the role of
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technology and adaptive behavior by people, organizations and societies (Cole et al., 1973;
Meadows et al., 1972). These studies also overstated the reliability of their predictions.
Second generation of scenarios
The 1970s saw a second wave of interest in scenario planning, especially in corporate
strategic planning. The traumatic effect of the ‘‘oil crisis’’ in 1973 drew attention to the
possibility for major unexpected changes in the international economic system (Godet,
1987). The new climate reinforced a shift from forecasting approaches to exploratory and
prospective approaches that provided a mechanism for searching for potential
discontinuities (Berkhout et al., 2002). These more recent approaches recognize that the
future cannot be extrapolated through data and relationships of the past, because drivers of
change in social systems are not only multiple but also interact in different ways and at
different speed. Although change in social and economic systems is often ‘‘directional’’,
path-dependent or ‘‘locked in’’, novelty and surprise are also inescapable features (Dosi,
1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982; North, 1990).
In the early 1970s, Ian Wilson at GE, Pierre Wack at Shell and Peter Schwarz at SRI
International redefined scenarios as descriptions of future conditions rather than accounts of
how events might unfold. From then on, scenarios offered a set of distinct alternative futures
to emphasize that the business environment was uncertain and could evolve in totally
different ways (Millett, 2003). Scenarios were not mere end state description, but they
especially highlighted dynamic interactions. Furthermore, they aimed to reflect a variety of
viewpoints so as to cover a broad range of future possibilities (Wack, 1985a, b). Note that
scenarios, in this sense, do not focus on single line forecasting nor on fully estimating
probability distributions, but rather on bounding and better understanding future
uncertainties. This treatment of uncertainty is quite different from more traditional methods
which usually present one model, with uncertainty nested within it (de Geus, 1988). The
scenario methods popularized by GE, Shell and SRI International emphasize creativity and
imagination. The practitioners of this method assert that a discontinuous future cannot be
reliably forecasted, but can be imagined and ‘‘lived in’’ as a means of learning from it.
Following this development, a shift can be seen from building scenarios for best estimates to
using them for measures of dispersion (Ringland, 2002).
Despite the fact that both streams of scenarios were meant for strategic planning, no
evaluation is available of how the results of the scenarios influenced decision-making.
Generally, few efforts were made to link scenarios to policy making by means of specific
strategies (Millett, 2003). This problematic relationship between long-term scenarios and
short-term action was supposed to improve in the upcoming years.
Third generation of scenarios
After the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) and the Earth Summit in 1992, a third wave of
global scenarios was launched in the context of the sustainability challenge. The attention for
sustainability is encouraged by the fear that humanity will not find a path to a desirable form
of global development (Raskin et al., 2002). From then on long-term, complex and uncertain
processes in society would no longer be seen as an inescapable fact-of-life, to be
understood in retrospect rather that be controlled pro-actively. Policy makers are not
detached and clinical observers of change (Bruggink, 2005), they are capable of shaping
their futures and of acting reflexively in response to new knowledge about what the future
may hold.
Based on this belief, Inayatullah (2002) assumes that in the upcoming years future studies
will evolve through changes in several areas. The first factor shaping the future of the field is
the move from single point forecasting (accurate and precise predictions) to scenario
planning (alternative futures) to foresight (institutional capacity building) to creating a
future-oriented and learning society. With the increased rapidity of change as well as
epistemological debates about the nature of knowing, living with uncertain futures instead of
creating a certain world has become far more important. Associated models favor
participatory, interactive, knowledge and transcendent-based associations. This new
perspective is concerned with using the future to create people that are reflexive of how
VOL. 8 NO. 5 2006 j foresightj PAGE 23
current policy decisions impact future generations and how the conscious and unconscious
image of the future guides the organization. Basically, this perspective is oriented towards
action learning, seeking to question the future and asking questions of preferred, probable
and possible futures at all levels. The second factor shaping the future is the move from
reductionism to accepting complexity. It requires accepting that there are many factors that
explain change and that there will always be some unknown factors. Complexity also
assumes that the novel may emerge in our scenario studies. Our findings must therefore be
open ended and ready to be discarded if a new or multiple paradigm(s) provide(s) more
elegant, informative and explanatory insights. Finally, complexity includes emergence, that
is, the new can emerge from the old. This helps to account for wildcards. Favoured methods
used in accepting complexity in future studies are environmental futures scanning
processes and incorporating insights that come from arenas outside official power – not just
political power but official formulations of what is normal, what is sane, what is conventional
or acceptable reality. Third, there will be a return to long-term research. Macro thinking and
explaining the big picture remains the elusive grail of futures studies. While some argue for
the new story, others believe that traditional worldviews – critically modernized – already
offer the big picture of who we are, where we are going to and what is important in the
long-term. The central feature of macro thinking is that there are generally grand patterns of
social change. While there are discontinuities, the past and future as a whole is patterned,
even if the ‘‘laws’’ are soft. Finally, scenario development will become more and more
concerned with moral futures. This means that scenarios of the future cannot just be
idealized pictures of the future without taking into account who are the losers of any
particular future as well as who is privileged to create particular futures. However, this latter
move in futures studies is not a done deal.
Positioning transition scenarios in a typology
By the time the sustainability challenge was introduced in scenario development processes,
the application of scenario practice had become very diverse, fragmented and widespread.
We will use the scenario typology of van Notten (2005) to give an impression of the various
scenariomethods thatwere, and still are, in use in this third generation.More important, wewill
use this typology to position transition scenarios, leading to insights about their
distinctiveness. Based on this we will draw lessons on the required innovations or
specifications in third generation scenario processes when dealing with TM processes. The
typology of van Notten (2005) is adequate in doing this, because it captures the widely
differing understandings of contemporary practice. This in contrast to most scenario and
foresight typologies, i.e. Amara (1981),Masini (1993),Mannermaa (1986), Inayatullah (1990),
Tapio and Hietanen (2002), that focus on particular aspects of scenario development.
The distinctiveness of transition scenarios
The scenario typology gives an overview of current scenario practice through a comparative
review of approximately 100 studies carried out since 1985 (van Notten, 2005). The studies
were conducted in a variety of contexts, including businesses such as the British Airways and
KPMG; ‘‘inter-company’’ cooperative efforts such as the Dutch Management Association
(NIVE) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD);
governmental organizations such as the Rotterdam port authority; broad based
participatory efforts such as those in South Africa and Colombia; and academic settings
suchas the Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange (IPCC) and theVISIONSproject. The
studies covered a variety of topics, including transport, telecom, nutrition, gender equality,
labour market, climate change and leadership (van Notten, 2005). The typology proceeds
from three main characteristics comprising central aspects of scenario development:
1. the project goal;
2. the process design; and
3. the scenario content.
Each of those three characteristics can be divided in three sub dimensions, and each sub
dimension on its turn consists of a continuum with two poles (see Figure 1). For a more in
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depth description of the scenario typology of van Notten (2005), we refer to his book Writing
on the Wall.
The shaded boxes in the figure represent the desired characteristics of transition scenarios.
These can all be inferred from the foregoing sections. The transition scenarios are not
positioned within this matrix with the purpose of exhaustively analyzing these scenarios in
light of the state-of-the-art. As we are trying to determine the distinctive character of
transition scenarios, the focus in this paragraph will be on illuminating those characteristics
that conceal the potential for innovation en existing scenario methods. Therefore, a more
elaborate description will be given of the hybrid characteristics of transition scenarios, those
that cannot be univocal allocated to the matrix. In this respect, the goal of the scenario in
relation to its function and normativity receive attention. In discussing this, we will follow on
the introduction, in which the relevance of embedding scenarios in a broader trajectory was
addressed.
Until now, most scenario applications have been carried out in isolation, serving the goal of
policy making. Therefore, they have a strong orientation towards content aspects of a
scenario that are of relevance for short-term strategies (Berkhout and Hertin, 2002; van der
Heijden, 2005; Schwartz, 2005; Ringland, 2002). Transition scenarios on the other hand also
serve a process function as they are embedded in a TM trajectory. Herein, transition
scenarios evolve from the first stage of the TM-cycle in which the borders of the system are
explored, persistent problems are structured and conditions for sustainable visions are set.
Transition scenarios build on and refine this knowledge by developing these further into
concrete storylines on a system level. The resulting transition scenarios provide direction
and focus for further stages in the TM-cycle by identifying sub themes that can be
developed into transition pathways on a tactical level, eventually leading to experiments on
an operational level. Thus, within scenario development, the process of seeking, learning
and experimenting is at least as important as the product. For this reason, we propose that in
the future more attention has to be paid to process related aspects of scenario development.
With regard to the inclusion of norms, transition scenarios distinguish themselves from the
majority of scenarios in that they are explorative and normative at the same time. Berkhout
and Hertin (2002) give us reason to believe that explorative and normative approaches act
under different assumptions and therefore cannot be used in combination when developing
a scenario. First of all, a normative approach is based on subjectivity, expressing
preferences and adding a positive or negative connotation to a scenario. An explorative
scenario in the other hand needs to be as objective as possible in order to map a possibility
space and inform decisions of the present. Also, a normative approach presupposes that
the future is not only a continuation of past relationships and dynamics but also can be
Figure 1 Transition scenarios positioned within the scenario typology of van Notten
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shaped by human choice and action while explorative approaches take past trends as their
starting point (Dreborg, 1996, cited in Berkhout and Hertin, 2002). Transition scenarios
combine these two approaches in that they map a possibility space (explorative) within the
boundaries of long-term sustainability (normative).
Transition-specific properties
Based on Figure 1 and the foregoing about the hybrid characteristics of transition scenarios,
we come to the conclusion that current scenario methods are still the basis for the
development of transition scenarios. This because there is a strong resemblancebetween the
theoretical claims of the second and third generation of scenarios and our criteria of transition
scenarios. However, due to the fact that most of their claims have never fully been realized in
practice, there is still a lot of work to do, i.e. in relation to the goal of a scenario, transition
scenarioscouldnotbeunivocally allocated to the typologyof vanNotten (2005), thereforenew
combinations in already existing characteristics of current scenario use are required. On top
of that, we can extract some transition specific characteristics that are not part of the typology
of van Notten (2005). Here lies the potential for innovation in existing methods.
First of all, transition scenarios are focused on a societal transition challenge. The TM-cycle
starts off with defining and marking the system that is of relevance for reaching future
sustainability. Based on these insights, persistent problems are identified and related
consequences are anticipated. To acquire an orientation that is directed towards future
sustainability and create a sense of urgency for tackling the problems at hand, a transition
challenge is formulated. When developing a transition challenge, persistent problems on the
short-term are transformed in desirable future states of the system on the long-term. This
process is also called ‘‘transitioning’’. In doing this, the context for deliberation is more or
less the same but more future oriented. By shifting the accent from problem solving to goal
seeking and from negative problems on the short-term to positive ambitions on the
long-term, a sense of urgency and a process of reframing are stimulated.
Second, transition scenarios take thesystem level as amainpoint fordescribing thedynamics
of a transition over a period of one or two generations. This approach is in line with the
recognitionof Agenda21, inwhich theneed for a systemic approachwasexplicitly expressed
(Raskinet al., 2002). Normally, a drawbackof describing the systemasawhole is that the level
of detail is rather limited.Also, the furtherone reaches into the future, themoreabstract and the
less certain it becomes, the less guidance it can offer for concrete short-term strategies.
However, these challenges are faced by embedding scenario development in the TM-cycle.
The transition scenarios are developed at a strategical level but continue throughout the
TM-cycle to be the framework within which transition pathways on a tactical level are
developed and experiments on an operational level are identified. In this sense, transition
scenarios become more and more refined when passing through the different phases of the
TM-cycle, therefore being able to offer guidance for short-term strategies.
Conclusions and recommendations
Before we reach conclusions and provide some recommendations for further research, we
want to start off with an image of scenario practice that troubles us and needs more attention
in the future. This as a run-up to our final conclusions and recommendations.
What is most problematic in our view is that theoretical claims are not a guarantee for
accurate translation into scenario practice, i.e. in theory, scenario development is in fact a
way to consider future discontinuity. Berkhout (2005) argues that, ‘‘scenarios provide a
response to the problems of discontinuity’’. However, this theoretical promise might not be
reflected in scenario practice (van Notten, 2005). A comparative study of scenarios
developed in the 1990s concluded that many scenarios have a business as usual character
and assume that current conditions will persist for decades (Greeuw et al., 2000). This
criticism is common. Bruun et al. (2002) argue that the overwhelming majority of scenarios
can be characterized as conventional and trend based. Similarly, Marien (2002) claims that
scenario studies often ignore the wild carts of low possibility. Brooks (1986, p. 326 cited in
van Notten, 2005) argues that the problem is not that analysts have been unaware of the
short-comings of surprise free thinking, but rather that they lack usable methodologies to
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deal with discontinuities and random events. Crisis management literature has repeatedly
noted the fact that ‘‘long before its actual occurrence, a crisis sends off a repeated and
persistent trail of early warning signals’’ (Mitroff, 1988, cited in Mendonc¸a et al., 2004). The
challenge is to assemble the myriad pieces of information into a meaningful mosaic. If we
neither take time to look at them nor consider how they might be anticipated, they are
guaranteed to catch us off our guard. Only in retrospection it becomes evident that even
those ‘‘all of a sudden’’ appearing discontinuities are preceded by so-called ‘‘weak signals’’.
These signals appear first in less plausible alternatives to current mental models but could
have been perceived in the run-up with adequate sensibility (Fink et al., 2004).
The underlying message of this example is that under conditions of higher uncertainty and
complexity, the authority of formal methods and experts tends to decline. Many practitioners
today argue that a balance of methods is desirable and that efforts should be made to
establish better links between them (Fontela, 2000: Greeuw et al., 2000, cited in Berkhout
and Hertin, 2002). This argument is common. Mannermaa (2000) argues that we need new
methods for understanding our world deeply enough to make well-argued scenarios of the
future. In line with this reasoning, the next great challenge in Millett’s (2003) opinion is to
stimulate synthesis in existing definitions and methods of scenarios into a new composite
approach. He believes that scenario methods are ready to evolve to the next level of
development. Scenario methods have been practiced for more than 30 years with many
marginal improvements but no radical revision. Millett (2003) argues that the next generation
of scenario tools should not only combine previous methods, but also actually blend them
into a more comprehensive methodology.
Conclusions
Returning to the points of view presented in this article while proceeding on the above
discussion, the positioning of transition scenarios within the scenario typology of van Notten
(2005) led to the insight that although transition scenarios have their basis in the prevailing
scenario methods, univocal allocation was not possible with regard to the goal-oriented
characteristics. Therefore transition scenarios can be characterized as a hybrid form of
scenario use, combining process and product functions while having both an explorative
and a normative orientation. Besides these differences, transition scenarios also contain a
few innovative characteristics that cannot be retrieved from the typology of van Notten
(2005), i.e. the focus on a societal transition challenge, the description of transition dynamics
at a system level, and the very long-term as an orientation for the short-term. Against this
background, we plead for a synthesis in existing scenario methods, consisting of new
combinations in prevailing scenario methods and innovations in existing methods.
Recommendations
Although we have addressed the need for a synthesis in existing scenario methods, we still
face the challenge of providing clear-cut answers. In trying to integrate scenario
development processes within TM processes, we stand at the beginning of exploring a
new research area. In line with the challenge we face, a few recommendations for further
research can be made.
First of all, although the relevance for scenario development within TM has been addressed,
research about scenario development within the context of TM has been poor. Further
systemic thought in this field is needed in order to get a clear and robust picture of the
requirements of transition scenarios, not only in theory but also in practice. This article is a
first establishment of the theoretical interpretation of criteria for transition scenarios. Second,
more attention needs to be paid to the process aspects of scenario development. While the
overwhelming scenario applications have been directed at content aspects of policy
making, transition scenarios are more bilateral in that they also serve the process of TM at
several scale levels. Research about the embedding of scenario development within the
TM-cycle is therefore important. Finally, when the theoretical and practical knowledge base
of transition scenarios is well considered and implications for embedding have been
contemplated, methods for the development of transition scenarios can be derived.
VOL. 8 NO. 5 2006 j foresightj PAGE 27
Notes
1. Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by
organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which
human impacts on the environment. Agenda 21 is adopted by more than 178 Governments at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992.
2. Informal name for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992.
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